Of course, this means that you may not see the blog for a while as I change the domain pointers in the deep dark belly of the interweb. Or, I might not be smart enought to get everthing working properly. Or I might just get frustrated and quit — I find that I start investing time and money in a project just before my short attention span fastens onto some other wildly foolish plan.

So, for those few handful of people who have stumbled onto this blog (I couldn’t tell you if anyone has ever been here twice) — keep checking back to see if I have everything up and running. If you never hear from me again, well… it’s been a moderate amount of fun.

Joe Long, an FSU Philosophy grad student, critiques Sam Harris’ argument (found in Letter to a Christian Nation) that the symmetry between religions means there is no reason to choose one over another, leaving atheism the only living option. In essence, since Muslims have the same reasons for faith as Christians — Islam has a holy book and a prophet, Christianity has a holy book and a prophet, etc. — there is no good reason to choose one over the other. Since all of our beliefs should be based on good reasons (a hopefully uncontroversial point) we have no unique good reasons to believe any particular faith. According to Harris, this is itself a good reason to not believe.

Here’s how Long analyzes Harris’ argument:

(1) One ought to hold a belief only if one has reason to hold that belief.

(2) The set of reasons for believing Christianity is identical […] to the set of reasons for believing Islam.

(3) The belief-content entailed by Christianity is inconsistent with content entailed by Islam.

(4) If (1), (2), and (3), then any bias toward Christianity or Islam is unwarranted, in which case one has insufficient reason to believe either Christianity or Islam.

(5) Therefore, one has insufficient reason to believe Christianity or Islam, and thus insufficient reason to believe Christianity.

Long shows that premise (2) is problematic. It might seem like Islam and Christianity have the exact same kinds of reasons for belief, but it truth there might be a tie-breaker reason hiding out there which tips the balance in favor of one or the other. It’s not always the case that the good reasons we have to believe are easily found or are obviously available to us.

While this is a fine tactic to take against Harris, it’s not really open to me, what with me being an atheist and all. But I think that Harris’ mistake is in (4) rather than (2), so that’s where I think we should give Harris the smackdown.

Take a look at (2). What kind of identity is Harris positing here? It might help to look at what he actually wrote (quoted from Letter to…):

Every devout Muslim has the same reasons for being a Muslim that you have for being a Christian.

Obviously these aren’t the ‘same’ reasons in the sense that one 1975 Corvette is the ‘same’ as another 1975 Corvette. No, they’re the ‘same’ reasons the way a 1975 Corvette is the ‘same’ as a 1992 Toyota Supra: they are both the ‘same’ in the sense that they are both go-fast sports cars. As this rather perceptive commenter points out:

If (2) is the correct rendering of Harris’ premise…it’s ambiguous between the set of reasons being equivalent from a neutral vantage point and the set of reasons being equivalent for each individual involved — that is, Harris is equivocating between different senses of ‘same’… Obviously they aren’t the ‘same’ as in identical, while they might be the ‘same’ as in equivalent.

So there are no reasons that a Christian and a Muslim have in common, but they both have equivalent reasons. So if a Christian (let’s call her C) has her reasons, and a Muslim (cleverly named M) has her reasons, where exactly do we get the contradiction Harris is aiming at?

C is rational in believing in Christianity because — via (1) and [her reasons for belief] — C has good reasons to so believe. But C must also believe that M is equally rational in her belief since M has exactly identical good reasons to believe in Islam. So if Christianity and Islam are equally rational there is no warranted reason to choose one over the other. Or: Harris assumes that there is a second-order irrationality in C thinking that M is both rational and wrong simultaneously.

Harris assumes that if the reasons are identical there is no non-arbitrary way for C and M to choose one religion over another; they are both in the position of Buridan’s Ass forever stuck between two equally appealing piles of hay. (So an uncharitable reading would see Harris as wanting both C and M to both starve due to indecision.)

But the reasons aren’t the same; they’re only equivalent. So we have the Christian Ass standing in a relation to a pile of hay, and we have a Muslim Cow standing in the equivalent relation to a pile of… um… whatever cows eat. There is no contradiction here, no way of saying that (2) is true since C and M have equivalent reasons for belief, yet (4) is true since they have no warrant for any bias towards their own particular feeding trough.

To conclude:

C can think that Islam is both rational (as in properly supported by reasons) yet wrong (as in the supporting reasons are false); therefore C can think that Christianity and Islam are both rational and also have a reason to choose one over the other.

So where Harris was shooting for an argument that proves any religious belief is unwarranted, the most he can prove is that one can’t hold other religions to be irrational when the situation described by (2) holds — at most, one can hold that they are wrong. Ultimately, I think that’s an OK result. ‘Wrong’ and ‘irrational’ aren’t coextensive.

The Christian Ass can fully appreciate that the Muslim Cow stands in the very same (i.e. equivalent) relation to her feeding trough as C does to her own, without thinking that M’s trough is equally appealing.

Where does the atheist stand in all this? We’re all going out for pizza. I certainly think that pizza is the most appealing option. But that doesn’t mean I should want to deprive C and M of whatever it is in their feeding troughs that makes them happy and leaves them satisfied; just because I don’t want it doesn’t mean I should take it away from them.

While I like my complex, structured style, it might be time to explore other ways to communicate using the written word. I do this for two reasons. One, my complex, structured style sometimes becomes a labored, leaden style. Two, complex subjects deserve to be explored simply. When you wrap complex concepts in baroque language you risk alienating your audience. When the subjects are important this is a disservice both to the concepts themselves, but also the people who could otherwise benefit from a clear exploration of the topic.

So I’ve been perusing the Economist Style Guide. It’s helping — some. Here’s how the above is phrased on the back of the book:

Clear thinking is the key to clear writing. So think what you want to say, then say it as simply as possible.

Readers are primarily interested in what you say. The way you say it may encourage them either to read on or to give up.

That’s good. Clear. Short. Pithy, almost. Someday I want to write just like that — nice and clear. But my head thinks in m-dashes & ampersands; semi-colons when ideas need to be piled up for effect; long lists of similar phrases to chart shifts in texture and tone.

So maybe there will be ancillary benefits. Perhaps learning clear-writing will lead to clear-thinking.

Technorati Tags: blogging, writing

What kind of atheist are you?
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Of course, there’s an obvious flaw. While PZ Meyers is a perfect Scientific Atheist, I actually beat him on the Militant Atheist score. Maybe I’m not as much of an appeaser as I thought?

Wanna know the truth about yourself? Go here.

The only good bit about blogging is the fact that it happens in real time. It’s like they’re almost interactive! A post today justifying the morality of torture gets a devastating response form Andrew Sullivan tomorrow — and we were there! We saw it happen! Reading blogs is much like watching the car chases on the California news; the vast majority of them are boring and uneventful, and a waste of time compared to watching Gene Hackman race around in The French Connection. The only thing that makes blogs interesting is that they’re happening right now!

Blogging also requires a writing style for which I am constitutionally unsuited. I like to pile on subjunctive clauses, to wind my way through complex sentence structures, to use rhythm and tone to point out the interesting or important bits. But blogging is different. It requires short sentences. Punchy, declarative sentences. Can’t loose their attention! Subtlety be damned! Make your point and move on. Any point that needs more than three sentences should be abandoned.

This very post is an example of both problems. I’ve been thinking about it for a while, but I finally just wanted to get it out of my head. And it should be much longer; I have more to say on the subject. But a blog doesn’t seem like the place to say it.

Technorati Tags: blogging

Even though PZ Meyers and I agree on all the substantial facts about the world, we disagree about the interpretation of those facts. I think religion in general and intelligent design specifically are wrong but not irrational. But I’m a Neville Chamberlain atheist.

But Meyers’ new comments on the Gonzalez case show why I think humility is important; it keeps basic mistakes at bay. There’s some double-quoting going on (from a Nature article on the case), and for that I apologize.

First Meyers quotes from the original article:

Gonzalez, who has been at Iowa State in Ames since 2001, was denied tenure on 9 March. He is now appealing the decision on the grounds that his religious belief, not the quality of his science, was the basis for turning down his application. “I’m concerned my views on intelligent design were a factor,” he says.

Meyers’ response:

His “views on intelligent design” were his “religious belief”? OK, that’s good enough for me. No tenure.

Of course, from the quote it’s unclear whether the words “religious belief” are Gonzalez’ own our are interpolations by the writer. Can Meyers even pretend to be unbiased if he bases his “no tenure” pronouncement on a grammatical ambiguity?

Of course, Meyers doesn’t even pretend to be unbiased. And, as I’ve mentioned before, that makes it difficult to make the case that science — as a value-free inquiry into the structure of nature — should have pride-of-place in public life and public policy. If science is intrinsically anti-religion, many people will happily jettison science and keep their faith. The world will be worse for it. But science isn’t intrinsically anti-religion, only certain scientists are.

Second mistake belongs to someone quoted in the Nature article:

But Park says that a researcher’s views on intelligent design cannot be divorced from the tenure decision. Anyone who believes that an intelligent force set the Earth’s location doesn’t understand probability’s role in the Universe, Park argues. Such a person is hardly qualified to teach others about the scientific method. “We’re entrusting the minds of our students to this person,” he says.

That Meyers quotes this can be taken as an endorsement, so my criticism applies to him by association. To say that intelligent design proponents ‘misunderstand’ the role of probability in the Universe is to confuse the two kinds of probability: objective, frequency-distribution probability versus epistemic, degree-of-belief probability. We don’t know with certainty that the Universe is random rather than designed. Rather, given our epistemic situation, we assign a very high probability to the randomness of the Universe. But the kind and structure of the Universe predicted by design proponents exactly matches the kind of Universe we do in fact see around us. So it’s not that Gonzalez “doesn’t understand probability’s role in the Universe”; it’s that Gonzalez disagrees with the prevailing orthodoxy about the probability that the Universe is random. To say otherwise is itself a mistake; it is to assign a probability of 0 to a possibility which can only be absolutely excluded on non-scientific grounds.

But, in Meyers defense, he does end by quoting this paragraph from the nature article:

Eli Rosenberg, who chairs Iowa State’s physics department, concedes that Gonzalez’s belief in intelligent design did come up during the tenure process. “I’d be a fool if I said it was not [discussed],” he says. But, he adds, “intelligent design was not a major or even a big factor in this decision.” Four of twelve tenure candidates have been turned down in the past decade, he says. “We are a fairly hard-nosed department.”

If this is so, then everything is hunky-dory; it means there is nothing to see here and and everyone — from Meyers to the Discovery Institute — should be quiet and move along. To say that it is good that Gonzalez was denied tenure — simply because he believes something outside the political mainstream — is itself a wholly political claim that goes against the norms of scientific practice. And it makes Gonzalez an ally and martyr for our real enemies: the non-scientific, wholly political and dishonest ID proponents like the Discovery Institute.

I want to briefly expand that last point and then I’ll stop ranting: we pro-science Darwinians should be trying to drive a wedge between smart people like Gonzalez and the intellectually vacant Discovery Institute contingent. Sometimes the religion versus science debate is framed in terms of reason versus superstition. I think it should be seen in terms of those who think knowledge should reflect truth and those who think it should be a hand-maiden to politics. If Gonzalez is as smart a scientist as his co-workers say he is, is seems to me he should be embraced by our side rather than forced into the arms of the enemy. Even though they disagree about what the truth will likely turn ought to be, Gonzalez, Meyers and Dawkins all probably have more in common with each other about the methods used to find it than Gonzalez has in common with the post-modern, anti-science vultures in the Discovery Institute.

Technorati Tags: Guillermo Gonzalez, Intelligent Design, Science

<Spoilers ahead>

Both involve secret conspiracies to blow up New York for political gain. But what’s the relationship between them? Are the producers and writers of “Heroes” secretly infected with the truth virus? Perhaps trying to make the idea more palatable for the general public? Or are those who actually believe the silly conspiracy theories unconsciously influenced by representations in the media they consume? If they see it on TV, they believe it in real life.

<End Spoilers>

Or are both of them instances of the tendency toward paranoia in American thought? We Americans are poor reasoners sometimes. We often assume — contra evidence — that the world is shaped just like our hopes or our fears. Much to the detriment our our ability to make our way through.

But the real question is this: when is Michelle Malkin going to take on “Heroes” the way she did Rosie O’Donnell and Ron Paul?

Technorati Tags: Heroes, Conspiracy, Television, Truthvirus

Here we have the same mistake, but from the other direction: Philip Ball claims that, even if we do discover the source of spontaneity (and presumably autonomy, although he doesn’t discuss it explicitly) we haven’t found free will per se, because ‘free will’ is simply a term without an existing referent:

The fact is that ‘free will’ is (like ‘life’ and ‘love’) one of those culturally useful notions that become meaningless when we try to make them ‘scientific’. That’s why it is unhelpful to imply that the brains of flies or humans might contain a ‘free will’ module simply because they have a capacity to scramble the link between cause and effect.

The argument in Uncommon Descent is, roughly, something like this:

1. Free will is required for responsibility.

(“Though many Darwinists shy away from the implications of their beliefs as they apply to ascribing responsibility for human behavior…”)

2. Free will is essentially non-material.

Therefore,

3. If free will is discovered, then it disproves materialism.

This is an obviously flawed argument. Premise (1) is perhaps true, but it doesn’t prove premise (2); (2) is often assumed to be true by religious apologists, but it requires some form of independent support. The conclusion (3) doesn’t follow from the premises unless one is seriously begging the question.

(EDIT: The question-begging assumption seems to be that since responsibility is immaterial, free will needs to be immaterial also.  But material features and properties can be necessary components of immaterial states; after all, the ability to act is itself both material/physical and necessary for responsibility.)

As far as I can tell, Ball argues similarly:

4. Free will is required for responsibility.

5. Responsibility is culturally constructed.

(‘As neuroscientists Michael Gazzaniga of Dartmouth College in New Hampshire and Megan Steven of the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center in Boson have pointed out, we act in a social context. “Responsibility is a social construct and exists in the rules of society,” they say. “It does not exist in the neuronal structures of the brain.”’)

Therefore,

6. Free will is culturally constructed and therefore not real in the same sense as neuro-physiological structures in the brain.

This is a better argument, but still wrong. The conclusion (6) doesn’t follow from the two premises.

But free will, as discussed by philosophers, moralists and neuroscientists, need not be strictly defined, except in terms of its effects:

7. ‘Free Will’ is just whatever allows free action.

So what is free will? We don’t know. It just is whatever allows humans — and maybe flies — to act freely. Of course, we need a good definition of “free” — but it presumably includes spontaneity and autonomy. So if we do discover neuronal structures required for our spontaneity and autonomy, we’ve found free will. Even if responsibility itself is socially and culturally constructed.

Technorati Tags: Neuroscience, Free Will, Philosophy of Science

I’m still not convinced it’s a total win for for Darwinist side. The way I see it there are at least three related Darwin/Intelligent Design arguments going on simultaneously:

1. The true account of the origin of biological diversity.
2. The (privileged ) role of science in public policy debates.
3. The role of science (including/especially biology) in our society.

Only the first is won or lost exclusively through scientific research, scientific practice and the norms of the scientific community. It is also the one we need to worry about the least, since Darwinian natural selection is true and Intelligent Design is false.

Guillermo Gonzalez didn’t do the work and didn’t get tenure, based on his quantity of research and the number of grants (zero) he received. So far, so good. But when this is seen in the scientific blogosphere as a win of Darwinism over Intelligent Design— not just the appropriate functioning of the tenure process, not just preservation of the norms of the scientific community, but a win in the Culture War between the forces of Darwinian Good and the Neo-Creationist Evil, it ends up loosing us ground in debates 2 and 3. I still think that if real, live scientists give off a whiff of scheudenfreude when an IDer doesn’t get tenure, it sends the wrong message to society at large; it tells them that science doesn’t deserve the privileged role in public life we think it ought have.

If the pro-science among us gloat over Gonzalez loosing his bid for tenure, simply because he belongs to the ID contingent, it’s actually worse if he was rejected for good reasons. That makes the anti-ID, anti-religious bias all the more obvious.

Technorati Tags: Creationism, Guillermo Gonzalez, Intelligent Design, Science